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CHA P T E R 7
Democracy and the good life in
Spinoza’s philosophy
Susan James
One of the features of Spinoza’s philosophy that makes it attractive to
many twenty-first-century readers is its defence of democracy as the con-
stitutional form of an ideal state. Although theTractatus Politicus breaks off
before spelling out the details of a democratic constitution, other texts
encourage the reader to envisage a free way of life as most fully realizable in
an inclusive polity, where subjects advance their understanding and liberty
by following laws they have made themselves. The view that human beings
have the potential to live most freely in democratic states1 is exceptional
among seventeenth-century writers, and Spinoza is the best-known of a
small group of Dutch authors who are justly celebrated for defending it.
Focusing on this claim, a range of commentators of various ideological
persuasions have hailed him as the initiator or inspiration of the modern
democratic tradition. According to Jonathan Israel, for example, ‘‘Spinoza
was the first major European thinker in modern times – though he is
preceded here by Johan de la Court and Van den Enden – to embrace
democratic republicanism as the highest and most fully rational form of
political organisation, and the one best suited to the needs of men.’’2
This is indeed one way to read Spinoza and, as I shall argue, it draws on a
central and inspiring strand of his thought. There are, however, other
strands, perhaps less straightforwardly susceptible to celebration, but
equally pertinent to an understanding of his assessment of democracy.
1 While many writers defended the view that one can only be free if one lives in a free state, i.e. a
republic as opposed to any form of monarchical regime, comparatively few authors regarded
democracy as a form of state conducive to freedom.
2 Israel 2001: 259. Israel’s claim is part of a broader debate about the history of democratic thought,
which embraces not only Spinoza but also his predecessor Thomas Hobbes. See Matheron 1997. See
also Tuck 2006: 171, where Hobbes is described as ‘‘a sophisticated and deep theorist of democracy.’’
Perhaps the most influential advocate of Spinoza as a theorist of democracy is Antonio Negri,
according to whom Spinoza develops a novel conception of the multitude, and articulates ‘‘the
democracy of the multitude as the absolute form of politics’’ (see Hardt and Negri 2000: 77). See also
Negri 1997.
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My aim in this chapter is to explore one of them, namely Spinoza’s view of
the role played by imagination in the exercise of sovereignty. Successful
sovereigns, as he describes them, need to deploy the skills of prophets in
order to devise legal systems that their subjects will obey. (All politics, one
might say, is in this sense prophetic.) While Spinoza gives us reasons for
concluding that the ends of the state are in principle best realised under a
democratic constitution, the art of creating and sustaining a democracy
depends on the imaginative ability of sovereign and subjects to legitimate
and realize a democratic way of life. To achieve this, they have to be able to
interpret the bare definition of democracy as a state in which the law is
made by the body of the people, by working out, for example, who is to be
included in this body and what it takes for such a body to make laws.
As Spinoza himself allows us to see, these questions can be answered in a
variety of ways. His own unfinished account of a stable, democratic
constitution begins by listing several classes of people who are to play no
part at all in government: aliens, on the grounds that they are not bound by
the law; women, servants, children and wards, on the grounds that they are
not independent; and criminals and others on the grounds that they are
dishonourable (TP 11.3). In the context of seventeenth-century political
thought, these exclusions are not surprising, and it would be pointless to
criticise Spinoza for advocating them. Nevertheless, I shall suggest, they
serve to draw attention to a limitation in his imaginative power – a
limitation he would himself describe both as a lack, and as the effect of
some obstacle standing in the way of his ability to imagine a fully inclusive
form of freedom. More generally, the gap between the democratic ideal
Spinoza offers us and his own imaginative grasp of what a democratic
society would be like inadvertently exemplifies one of the problems with
which he is explicitly concerned. Because the pursuit of freedom is held
back by the imaginative limitations of communities, part of the task of the
sovereign is to cultivate the kind of insight possessed by prophets, and
make a free way of life imaginatively accessible.
In the past generation, our understanding and appreciation of Spinoza
has been transformed by Ed Curley. His outstanding textual scholarship,
together with his profound insight into the problems Spinoza was trying to
solve, has opened up numerous invigorating lines of enquiry; and the care
and acuity of his own philosophical writing has set a high standard for
others to reach. One of Curley’s central aims has been to examine the
interconnections between Spinoza’s works and those of Descartes and
Hobbes, and in doing so he has helped us to gain a fuller picture of
the way Spinoza draws on and transforms the doctrines of his great
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predecessors. Curley’s invaluable research has, among other things,
enlarged our understanding of the theologico-political debates in which
Hobbes and Spinoza were both engrossed, and revealed the subtler sim-
ilarities and differences in their respective political positions. Democracy
is, of course, one of the issues on which these two giants disagree,3 and in
attempting to clarify the nature of Spinoza’s commitment to a democratic
society this chapter aims to follow out Curley’s philosophical approach, as
well as one of his many philosophical interests.
I S O V E R E I GN S AND P RO PH E T S
Sovereignty, according to Spinoza, can be held equally well by an individ-
ual or by a collectivity, and to make it easier to keep this fact in mind I shall
always refer to the figure of the sovereign as ‘‘it.’’ However, regardless of
whether the sovereign is an individual or a group, its task is always the
same: to promote peace and security by ensuring that its subjects obey the
law; and to counteract vices which, whilst they are not contrary to law,
nevertheless diminish the state. For example, when a long-lasting peace
makes citizens slack and slothful, sovereigns must find ways of redirecting
their energies into activities that enhance security (TP 10.6). A sovereign
therefore bears responsibility for creating both a legal structure and a
broader way of life that successfully reconcile the diverse desires of
individuals, and for inducing its subjects to promote harmony and co-
operation within the state.
At one point in the Tractatus Politicus, Spinoza contrasts security with
liberty, and seems to suggest that sovereigns need only concern themselves
with the first. The virtue of the state, he writes, is security, whereas liberty is
a private virtue (TP 1.6). Elsewhere, however, he is adamant that security
and liberty are so closely intertwined that the one cannot exist without the
other. As the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus is largely designed to show,
states are most secure when their subjects are not coerced into obeying the
law, but obey willingly because they realise that it is in their interest to do so
(TTP Pref. 12). Furthermore, subjects who understand the benefits of
co-operating by obeying the law are freer than those who do not. The
ultimate purpose of the state (res publica) ‘‘is not to exercise dominion nor
to restrain men by fear and deprive them of their independence, but on the
contrary to free every man from fear so that he may live in security as far as
3 This claim has recently been challenged by Tuck 2006. Responding to Tuck, Kinch Hoekstra has
offered a thorough defence of it. See Hoekstra 2006.
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possible . . . It is not, I repeat, to transform men from rational beings into
beasts or puppets (automata), but rather to enable them to develop their
mental and physical capacities in safety, to use their reason without
restraint and to refrain from the strife and vicious mutual abuse that are
prompted by hatred, anger or deceit. Thus the purpose of the state is, in
reality, freedom’’ (TTP 20.6).4 Sovereigns should therefore aim to cultivate
circumstances in which individuals have enough security and freedom to
appreciate the advantages of a co-operative form of existence, and to be in a
position to enhance it. Although it would be too much to hope that such a
policy will eliminate conflict completely, it can nevertheless minimize
threats such as faction, corruption and civil war, any of which can under-
mine the sovereign’s power and ultimately destroy the state.
Abstracting from the merits and disadvantages of specific constitutional
forms, Spinoza provides a general account of the problems a sovereign
confronts and the means by which it can ameliorate them. The root of its
difficulties lies in the inadequate ideas that constitute human imagination,
and specifically human passion (E 4p37s2). Affects such as desire, sadness
and joy are part of our everyday way of responding to the world; but
because they reflect our disposition to imagine ourselves as singular
things, and obscure our understanding of the extent to which we depend
on other parts of nature, they give us a partial and sometimes distorted
view of what will damage or benefit us. Furthermore, it is hard to
recognize and avoid the harms to which our affects expose us. For one
thing, the phenomenology of freedom – the sense that, when we experi-
ence and act on our affects, we are in control of ourselves and what we are
doing – obscures the need to take stock of individual passions and get
some critical distance on them. In addition, we are in Spinoza’s view
naturally prone to certain patterns of feeling and action which have a
strong hold over us. Some of these dispose us to productive affects such as
love and compassion; but others incline us to negative passions such as
hatred or fear, which tend to inhibit co-operation. (E 3p33–5; p55s).
Together with the causal sequences in which they are embedded, these
latter passions habitually feed insecurity, and left to themselves are liable
to undermine the effectiveness of the state. The first task of the sovereign
is therefore to contain them.
4 Against this interpretation, Balibar believes that there is a marked shift in Spinoza’s view. Whereas
Spinoza argues in the TTP that the end of political society is freedom, in the TP ‘‘freedom is no
longer the declared ‘purpose’ of the state. The central preoccupation now is civil peace or security.’’
See Balibar 1998: 116.
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One way to achieve this end is to terrorize subjects into obedience, but
while threats and force are essential tools of government, Spinoza joins
many of his contemporaries in urging that they should be used sparingly.
Quoting Seneca, he repeatedly reminds his readers that sovereigns who
resort to strong-arm tactics rarely survive for long, because subjects who
obey the law only out of fear will do what they can to resist (TTP 5.8; 16.9).
However fiercely they are oppressed, they always constitute a formidable
threat.5 Sovereigns therefore do better to ensure that their subjects’ devo-
tion to the law is stronger than their desire to pursue illegal goals. Even
when this strategy succeeds, individuals may still find themselves torn
between an inclination to obey and a desire to break the law, or between
a desire to conform to standards of civic virtue and a longing to satisfy
their private interests. But the mixture of encouragements and threats
implicit in legal and other institutions and practices will on the whole
guarantee that co-operation wins out. Passion will counter passion, and
subjects will experience the decision to abide by the law as a choice they
have made willingly, albeit sometimes reluctantly (E 4p7).
Where this level of co-operation has been achieved, individuals have
already begun to identify their interests with those of the polity. In doing
so, they have simultaneously begun to think of themselves not merely as
singular things, but also as members of a community that is, ‘‘as it were, one
body and one mind’’ (E 4p18s3). To realize that the best way to serve one’s
own interests is to play one’s part in maintaining and strengthening the
security of the community is, according to Spinoza, to understand an
important truth, which in turn strengthens one’s desire to resist affects
that undermine co-operation. Once one appreciates the social damage that
envy can do, one has a reason for trying to control it in oneself and in others
by understanding how it comes about and what can be done to prevent it.
Equally, once one understands that fear tends to breed hatred, which in
turn brings a string of debilitating effects in its train, one has a reason for
trying not to cause fear in others, and trying not to succumb to it oneself.
Modifying one’s passionate dispositions is, however, a complex project
and cannot be undertaken in isolation. It depends on the guidance and
support of other individuals, and on standards of co-operation encouraged
and enforced within a society (TTP 16.5). Part of the sovereign’s task is
5 In the Latin Leviathan of 1668, Hobbes brings this general point to bear on the history of the
Netherlands. ‘‘For the common people are the strongest element of the commonwealth . . . The
sedition of those in Holland, called the Beggars, ought to serve as a warning how dangerous it is in
the commonwealth to scorn citizens of modest means’’ (Hobbes 1994: 227–28 (ch. 30)).
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therefore to use its power to sustain an environment in which subjects can,
so to speak, co-operate in increasing their ability to co-operate. As they do
so, they protect themselves from the destructive effects of their own
passions, thereby increasing the security of the state.
This process is an eminently practical one, requiring not only a more or
less philosophical understanding of the laws of nature, but also a flair for
applying them to particular situations (TTP 5.9). A sovereign may know,
for example, that one passion can be used to control another, and have a
rough grasp of our disposition to imitate one another’s affects. However,
while general knowledge of this sort is helpful, it will not be enough. To
motivate its subjects to obey its commands, a sovereign will also need to
take account of their own particular affective dispositions, and will need
to pose questions such as ‘‘Are these people susceptible to shame, or are they
too alienated to care what others think of them?’’ or ‘‘Will fear of divine
anger weigh with these subjects, or are they so scared that they will break
the law to worship a golden calf?’’ (E 3p39). To arrive at answers, sovereigns
must possess the sort of local knowledge that Spinoza classifies under the
heading of imagination, and must be able to enter into the imaginative
business of devising laws with which their subjects will be in sympathy. In
the process they may make use of education, civil associations or religion to
create a climate of co-operation, but it is up to them to find effective ways
of deploying these resources.
This imaginative aspect of the sovereign’s task bears comparison with
the role of the prophet. In the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, Spinoza
characterizes prophets as individuals whose exceptional powers of imagi-
nation enable them to perceive the vital importance of a co-operative way
of life, and to express their insights in a manner accessible and persuasive to
a particular community (TTP 1.27). When philosophers explain the value
of co-operating with others by arguing from premises about the nature and
circumstances of human beings, their audiences may or may not be con-
vinced. Individuals or groups who are wrapped up in their own passionate
interpretations of themselves will not always find this kind of reasoning
persuasive. By contrast, the genius of a prophet lies in the ability to employ
images or stories that appeal to the situation and temperament of a specific
people, thus offering them a compelling account of the benefits of living
co-operatively, or of resolving a current problem in a co-operative fashion.
In giving meaning to a situation, a prophet suggests a way of dealing with it
that is both acceptable and more or less within reach.
There are, Spinoza stipulates, no longer any prophets to whom the
divine law is revealed (TTP 1.7). Nevertheless, the integrity of a political
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society depends on civil laws that re-enact the precepts of their divine
counterparts in the form of commands imposed by the sovereign. Like the
God of the prophets, the state commands obedience, and the need to make
its laws acceptable remains as pressing as ever. Communities still need to
build harmonious ways of life, and subjects still have to be encouraged to
resolve the tensions between their civic and private interests in favour of the
law. In the state, the task of achieving these ends falls to the sovereign. Like
prophets, sovereigns must offer subjects empowering accounts of their
situation and prospects, so that the courses of co-operative action specified
by the law will strike them as desirable and attainable. However, whereas
the narratives of prophets centred on the relation between a community
and God, a sovereign’s narrative focuses on its own law. Explicating and
justifying the law is therefore a means of explaining a community to itself
by interpreting its needs and possibilities in terms that it can accept and put
into practice.
The parallel between sovereign and prophet is confirmed in a note to the
Tractatus Theologico-Politicus which points out that, rather as a prophet’s
authority rests on a revelation that an audience cannot experience for itself
but has to accept, so the sovereign’s authority cannot be derived from the
law but must be accepted as its source (TTP 1 n. 2). In each case, authority
stems from the very act of giving meaning, whether in the form of
revelation or law, and in each case survival or power depends on the ability
to perform this action in a way that is compelling and practically effica-
cious. The prophet who cannot convince his people that the divine law has
been revealed to him, thereby persuading them to do as he says, ceases to be
a prophet; and the sovereign who cannot impose his authority by getting
subjects to obey the civil law ceases to be a sovereign (TTP 17.4).
In many states, past and present, politics largely proceeds in imaginative
terms. Sovereigns legitimate the law by means of narratives and images that
they and their subjects find compelling, thus uniting individuals whose
passions are otherwise conflicting and disparate. Spinoza evidently believes
this strategy can work extremely well; for example, the success of the Jewish
state under Moses was primarily due to his imaginative power, which far
outstripped his understanding of nature. However, there are also cases in
which the efficacy of imagination and the demands of philosophical
understanding conflict, and have to be reconciled. This problem is
explored at an individual level in Book IV of the Ethics, where Spinoza
outlines the characteristics of the free man, who does his best to live as his
understanding dictates, and cultivates the two key virtues of animositas (the
determination to live in accordance with his understanding) and generositas
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(the determination to co-operate with others) (3p59s). Nevertheless, in the
course of his everyday life he has to deal with people whose understanding
is less extensive than his own, and who are therefore apt to engage with him
in passionate and potentially destructive ways. Building on Spinoza’s own
account of this situation, we can imagine a free man who has been given
special treatment by a merchant and expects the favour to be returned. The
free man knows that partiality can generate envy and suspicion, and wishes
he had been able to avoid the favour; but since it has been incurred, he has
to decide how to respond. If he refuses to reciprocate, the merchant will feel
angry and resentful, and co-operating with him will becomemore difficult.
So, taking account of what is utile as well as what is in line with ratio, the
free man concludes that the best course will be to return the favour in some
way that is legal (and so does not undermine the authority of the law) yet
acceptable to both parties (4p70).
In working out what to do, the free man does not insist on standards of
behaviour that he knows to be virtuous, but bends to the passions he
encounters. Rationality, and thus freedom, does not consist in sticking to
the norms of virtue come what may, but lies in maintaining a co-operative
way of life, thus keeping open the possibility of enhancing understanding.
So although he feels the tension between the demand of understanding and
the demand of his total situation, the free man resolves it by giving priority
to maintaining harmony in the community of which he sees himself as a
part (4p73). Moreover, his capacity to solve the problem in this way
depends on his sensitivity to the imaginations of those around him, and
on his appreciation of the passionate consequences of different courses of
action. As individuals become more free, they lose some of their affective
investment in practices that have grown up around passionate dispositions
they no longer share, but they cannot turn their backs on the imagination.
It is, after all, one of their objects of study, as well as an unavoidable aspect
of their lives.
In the Ethics, Spinoza suggests that retaining a sensitivity to other
people’s passions while refraining from responding to them in passionate
terms is a continual demand upon the wise. As he explains, ‘‘It requires a
singular power of mind to bear with each one according to his under-
standing, and to restrain oneself from imitating their affects’’ (4 Appendix
13). Nonetheless, as he had earlier pointed out, it is a good rule ‘‘to speak
according to the power of understanding of ordinary people (vulgi), and to
do whatever does not interfere with attaining our purpose. For we can gain
a considerable advantage if we yield as much to their power of under-
standing as we can. In this way, they will give a favourable hearing to the
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truth’’ (TdIE, Introduction, 17). Unless the wise accommodate themselves
to the less wise by speaking and acting in terms that the latter can under-
stand, the less wise will not find the claims of reason appealing, and their
animositas will be held back. This in turn will impede their understanding
of the value of co-operation, with the result that the freedom of the
community as a whole will suffer. To avoid this outcome, the free man
will do his best to enhance the animositas of those around him by cultivat-
ing the qualities of the prophet, and interpreting and implementing his
knowledge in a manner that makes it attractive and accessible. Freedom, as
Spinoza conceives it, is therefore always dependent on the extent to which
particular individuals and communities are able to imagine ways of life that
embody the general truths revealed by reasoning, thereby bringing co-
operation within reach.
Spinoza’s sketch of how the free man negotiates with others offers us an
insight into the way that reason and imagination can work together to
enhance co-operation and liberty. If we now return to the sphere of
government, we see that a sovereign who has some understanding of the
nature and purpose of the state needs to pursue a comparable policy. Just as
free men aim to accommodate the passions of the people with whom they
have dealings, sovereigns do best to accommodate the passions of their
subjects, while simultaneously doing all they can to encourage an appreci-
ation of the benefits of obeying the law. As Gatens and Lloyd put the point,
‘‘the best authority structures are ones which are realistic about the need to
regulate human passions without cancelling the capacity for all to develop
reason.’’6 There is, however, an important difference between the individ-
ual and political cases. Whereas a free man’s pursuit of freedom is shaped
by his obedience to the law, the main arena in which sovereigns aim to
marry imagination and understanding is precisely that of legislation. In
exercising their legal authority, they are guided by whatever knowledge of
nature they possess; but they will only succeed inmaking the law acceptable
and effective if they take account of their subjects’ imaginative grasp of
their own condition. And for this, as we have seen, they need a share of the
skills pre-eminently possessed by prophets.
I I S E C U R I T Y , F R E E DOM AND D EMOCR AC Y
If we accept this account of the sovereign’s task, we can move on to
consider whether there are reasons for thinking that democratically
6 Gatens and Lloyd 1999: 120.
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organized societies are better adapted to the cultivation of security and
freedom than states with other kinds of constitution. To put the question
in the terms we have been examining, is there any reason to think that,
when sovereignty rests with all the people, the law can be imaginatively
represented in a way that is particularly compelling, and therefore moves
subjects to obey it more willingly than otherwise? One way to reach an
answer is to continue to pursue the implications of Spinoza’s account of the
free man. To begin with, we need to put aside the limiting case of a
community made up of individuals who are so perfectly co-operative
that they no longer have a use for coercion, and therefore in a sense have
no need of the state. Following Spinoza’s lead, we can view this condition
as the unrealizable culmination of a schematically represented process in
which human beings who are passionate and prone to conflict (and who
therefore need a sovereign with power to coerce them) create ways of life in
which they can be progressively more free. The question then is whether
there is anything in this process that inclines them in the direction of
democracy.
We learn in the Ethics that freedom grows with rational understanding,
which brings with it an appreciation of the need for co-operation. Free men
co-operate, or join themselves to others in friendship (E 4 Appendix 11)
because they realize that this is the best way to foster a community capable
of developing the kind of knowledge that enables individuals to limit the
damaging effects of their passionate dispositions. To some extent their
undertaking is a matter of extending a community’s shared understanding
of universal laws of nature; but as we have seen, it is also a matter of creating
circumstances in which local knowledge can be brought to bear on the task
of harmonizing the desires of particular, historically situated individuals
(TP 3.7). What, though, are the political implications of this project?
According to Spinoza, the only systematic way to moderate the destructive
effects of passion, and harmonize individual interests, is to live under a
sovereign in a state (4p73). So what sort of sovereign will free men favour?
Since their ultimate aim is to include each individual in the collective
enterprise of devising a co-operative way of life, and since an absolutely
crucial element of such amodus vivendi is the law, free men will presumably
regard as optimal a system that gives every member of the community a
voice in making legislation. Democracy will have the benefit of allowing
each individual to raise the quality of political debate by contributing
relevant items of knowledge. Furthermore, it will enable each individual
to play a part in the imaginative task of formulating laws that make sense,
and are therefore effective.
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Given that each embodied human being differs from every other and has
a history of their own, each imagines to some extent in their own way, and
can bring a different experience to bear on the collective project of creating
a way of life that is secure and free. Under a democratic constitution, a state
therefore increases its chances of devising laws, and indeed other institu-
tions, that are responsive to the values and desires of its subjects and are
consequently likely to be willingly obeyed. (To put this point the other way
round, excluding subjects from the task of contributing to legislation
endangers the security of the state by increasing the risk that its laws may
turn out to be unacceptable to some sections of the population, who will
therefore have to be forced to conform to them.) In addition, a democratic
state can use the imaginative capacities of all its subjects to articulate the
benefits of its own particular form of co-operation under the law, and to
work out ways of extending the liberty of subjects. To settle for a less
inclusive form of constitution would therefore be to deprive the state of the
very insights it needs in order to sustain and develop a secure and harmo-
nious way of life. Subjects who appreciate the force of this argument will
recognize that democratically made laws reflect both the rational and
imaginative resources of the community, and are liable to be well adapted
to its needs. They therefore have a general reason for obeying them.
Furthermore, as members of the community, who share some aspects of
its outlook and are comfortable with the terms in which law is justified and
made intelligible, they are likely to find its particular laws relatively easy to
accept and follow.
Spinoza encourages us to understand his account of the free man and the
life he leads as an exemplar or model (E 4 Pref.). While it sets a moral
standard that human beings may not be able fully to attain, it nevertheless
provides a norm of perfection against which individuals and communities
can measure and assess their own conceptions and enactments of the good
life.7 If we now consider what sort of political constitution would enable a
community to approach this condition, we arrive at a complementary
model of a democratic state. It holds out an image of a perfectly inclusive
polity that is, like its moral counterpart, beyond human reach;8 but in spite
7 I am indebted here to a magisterial discussion of the role of this exemplar in Spinoza’s ethics byMoira
Gatens. See ‘‘Imagination, Religion and Morality: the Vicissitudes of Power in the Tractatus
Theologico-Politicus’’ (unpublished). The view that the image of democratic society implicit in the
Ethics functions as an exemplar offers a response to Verbeek’s claim that democracy is for Spinoza a
nostalgic ideal. See Verbeek 2003: 141.
8 See Matheron 1994: 164.
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of this, it serves as a means of thinking critically and creatively about
politics.9
Although Spinoza does not explicitly advance the view that we should
think about democracy in this manner, his account of the free man’s way of
life undoubtedly incorporates a strong pull towards a democratic state. In
addition, the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus contains a different argument
for democracy, not as the kind of state consonant with the rich forms of
freedom that emerge out of the collective pursuit of understanding and
co-operation, but rather as the type of constitution it would make sense to
choose if one were in a state of nature. This argument follows the lines laid
down by Hobbes, who had contended inDe cive that ‘‘when men have met
to erect a commonwealth, they are, almost by the very fact that they have
met, a Democracy.’’10 As soon as individuals in the state of nature come
together to form a polity, they must agree to be bound by the will of the
majority in choosing a sovereign to represent them; but in agreeing to this
rule they have already in effect set up a democracy. Echoing this thought,
Spinoza explains that, when individuals in the state of nature transfer their
right to the community, ‘‘such a community’s right is called a democracy,
which can therefore be defined as a united body of men which corporately
possesses sovereign right over everything within its power’’ (TTP 16.8).
Moreover, a democracy is ‘‘the most natural form of state, approaching
most closely to that freedom which nature grants to every man. For in a
democratic state, nobody transfers his natural right to another so com-
pletely that thereafter he is not consulted; he transfers it to the majority of
the entire community of which he is a part. In this way all men remain
equal, as they were before in a state of nature’’ (TTP 16.11).
Here the emphasis is not so much on the collective benefit of giving all
subjects a voice in the process of making the law as on the individual
9 This interpretation offers a way to understand Spinoza’s claim that ‘‘absolute sovereignty, if such a
thing exists, is really the sovereignty held by the whole people.’’ (TP 7.3). Compare Negri 1997. In
keeping with the interpretation offered here, Balibar describes democracy as ‘‘the ‘truth’ of every
political order, in relation to which the internal consistency, causes and ultimate tendencies of
constitutions can be assessed’’ (Balibar 1998: 33).
10 ‘‘When men have met to erect a commonwealth, they are, by the very fact that they have met, a
Democracy. From the fact that they have gathered voluntarily, they are understood to be bound by
the decisions made by the agreement of the majority. And that is a democracy, as long as the
convention lasts, or is set to reconvene at certain times and places. For a convention whose will is the
will of all the citizens has sovereign power. And because it is assumed that each man in this
convention has the right to vote, it is a Democracy . . .’’ Hobbes 1998: 94 (ch. 7, sect. 5). Kinch
Hoekstra points out that Hobbes is talking here about the origin of ‘‘commonwealths by institution’’
and not ‘‘commonwealths by acquisition,’’ and is therefore not claiming that all commonwealths
start out as democracies. See Hoekstra 2006: 207–09.
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disadvantage of being excluded from this process. The argument invites us
to address the issue in the light of our natural inclination to conceive of
ourselves as separate individuals, and to focus on the question of how best
to maintain our right or power. When we view ourselves in this light, we
are led to see that democracy is in a sense the most minimal form of state,
where individuals retain as much right as possible. And from the perspec-
tive of the state of nature, this is the state to choose. ‘‘In a community where
sovereignty is vested in all the citizens, and laws are sanctioned by common
consent,’’ each person can bind themselves to follow the law, and in a sense
no one need obey it, ‘‘since obedience consists in carrying out orders simply
by reason of the authority of one who commands’’ (TTP 5.9). If we put this
argument together with the case for democracy as a political ideal, democ-
racy emerges, conceptually speaking, as the first and last form of state. It
marks the most natural transition from the state of nature because it best
preserves our natural right; and it is also most consonant with the forms of
freedom that emerge from the shared understanding and mutual co-
operation of subjects.
Why, then, are there any non-democratic states? When Hobbes
addresses this question in De Cive he outlines the various transfers of
power through which democracies can be transformed into aristocracies
or monarchies.11 Spinoza approaches the problem from a different angle by
dwelling on the gap between a principled defence of democracy and the
qualities that are in practice needed to create and sustain a democratic
sovereign. As we have seen, it takes a certain imagination and understand-
ing to realize a democratic way of life, and in communities where this is
lacking the form of life will be unsustainable. So even if we allow Hobbes’s
point that some political societies start out as democracies, a democratic
constitution will only endure if a particular community is able to maintain
it. Although the potential benefits of democracy militate in its favour,
they do not by themselves ensure that a given political society will be
attracted by them, or guarantee that existing democratic states will be
successful. Everything will depend on the history and circumstances of
the relevant community and its members.12 Spinoza illustrates these points
11 Hobbes, On the Citizen, ch. 7, sects. 8 and 11 (Hobbes 1998: 95–96).
12 Matheron argues that obstacles to democracy are always external to the power of the multitude. ‘‘The
existence of every non-democratic regime is explained by the conjunction of two factors: on the one
hand, the power of the multitude, which desires to live in common agreement, which consequently
attempts to find a terrain of understanding among all its members, which thus attempts to organise
itself into a democracy; and on the other hand, external causes that prevent it from directly realising
this tendency and obligate it to satisfy it by diverted paths and by resorting to a mediator’’ (Matheron
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by appealing to various historical cases. First, democracies are not always
stable. For instance, when the Jews escaped from slavery they proved
psychologically unequal to self-government and, out of fear, abandoned
their attempt to form a democracy in favour of a kind of theocratic
monarchy under the rule of Moses (TTP 17.7). Or to take another
example, this time mentioned in the Tractatus Politicus, a democracy
may turn itself into an aristocracy by deciding to exclude a class of aliens
from government (TP 8.12).13
In neither of these cases is it clear that Spinoza regards the movement
away from democracy as a turn for the worse. He praises the Jewish state as
exceptionally peaceful, and long-lived; and, judging from the Tractatus
Politicus, he is also convinced that well-designed aristocracies can be stable
and harmonious (TP 8.9). Transitions from a more to a less inclusive form
of constitution are therefore not necessarily to be deplored, and in some
circumstances a non-democratic form of government may be better able to
guarantee security, and thus a degree of liberty, than a democratic one.
Equally, transitions in the other direction are, in Spinoza’s view, not always
beneficial. For example, when the English executed their king and set up a
republic in 1649, they turned out to lack the understanding and imagina-
tion needed to make their new constitution stable, and after a short time
reverted to a monarchy (TTP 18.8).14On the whole, then, ‘‘every state must
necessarily preserve its own form, and cannot be changed without incur-
ring utter ruin’’ (TTP 18.10).
In assessing a state of any type, we therefore need to consider how
successfully its sovereign is fulfilling its task. (How far is it managing to
make laws that are obeyed, and how lively is its subjects’ sense of the
benefits of co-operation?) As a claim about security, this view makes a
certain amount of sense; but as a claim about the freedom with which
security is supposed to be yoked, it may be harder to accept. Surely, one
might object, the subjects of an absolute ruler such as Moses, who play no
1997: 217). I think this interpretation underestimates the extent to which the obstacles that prevent
states frommoving towards a freer way of life can in Spinoza’s view be constitutive of whatMatheron
calls the power of the multitude, rather than external to it.
13 The Aristotelian view that different constitutions suit different societies was not uncommon in
seventeenth-century Holland. For example, it was advocated in the 1640s at the University of Leiden
by Franco Burgersdijk, who argued that, although democracy is by nature the most imperfect form
of state, there can be conditions where it is preferable to the alternatives. The same view was defended
a decade later by Boxhorn, who held that no particular form of government was the best in all
circumstances. See Burgersduik 1686: 189–90 (cited by Blom 1995: 97). See also Boxhornius 1657: 4
(cited by Wansink 1981: 100).
14 The harm purportedly done by the English civil war is even more vividly portrayed by De la Court:
1662: Part III, Book III, ch. 6.
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role in making the law, are bound to be less free than those of a democratic
sovereign. Still worse, didn’t the prophetic basis of the Jewish state encour-
age utter subservience to God and Moses, thus holding back the growth of
understanding? To appreciate Spinoza’s response, we need to distinguish
his model of ideal democracy from the particular democratic societies that
have been, and might be, established in the course of human history.
Subjects whose way of life approaches the standard of the first will indeed
possess more freedom than is possible under an absolute monarchy or
indeed any other form of non-democratic constitution; but Spinoza’s
examples, together with his warnings about the way that passions such as
fear and the need for admiration can undermine political stability, remind
us that democracies can also fail. Where a democratic sovereign and
subjects cannot between them create basic forms of security, and therefore
find themselves in a situation that they experience as unacceptably preca-
rious, they may as a matter of fact abandon their constitution for one that is
less inclusive. Furthermore, it is possible that, under their new form of
government, they may achieve forms of co-operation that were lacking
earlier on, and constitute an increase in freedom.
To summarize the arguments discussed so far, there are according to
Spinoza two reasons why effective democratic constitutions are in principle
desirable: they enable individuals to retain as much of their natural right as
possible; and they provide optimal political circumstances for cultivating a
free way of life. In practice, however, historically situated polities may or
may not be able to realize these potential advantages, because each is
shaped by its own history and traditions, which will always play a major
part in determining the kind of constitution it can achieve. Appealing to
the democratic ideal, we can distance ourselves from these constraints
and assess some societies as more free than others. But once we come
down to earth, we are bound to recognize that a theocratic, monarchical
or aristocratic constitution may deliver all the freedom that a particular
community is at that time capable of attaining. To take the starkest of
Spinoza’s examples, when the Jews emerged from slavery they could only
co-operate effectively under threat of divine punishment, and were not in
a position to exercise the liberty that comes with voluntarily obeying
the law. The form of freedom they enjoyed was limited; but it was never-
theless the most they could manage to achieve (TTP 2.15). If we now
extrapolate to less extreme circumstances, where a non-democratic com-
munity already has a way of life that gives its members some appreciation
of the benefits of co-operation, we can see that its constitution need not
be inimical to freedom. Non-democratic constitutions are therefore not
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always destructive of liberty. On the contrary, they may protect it, and
provide the conditions for its enhancement.
I I I T H E L I M I T S O F F R E E DOM
A troublesome feature of this argument is the implicit suggestion that the
subjects of any state, however oppressive, can be said to be free. Is there,
then, a lower boundary of liberty, below which a political community that
has not yet disintegrated is nevertheless so dysfunctional that its sovereign
can be described as failing to provide security and freedom for its subjects?
To put the point differently, what is it to live under a sovereign and yet be
unfree? Drawing on a republican discourse stemming from Roman Law,
Spinoza couches this question in terms of the difference between subjects
and slaves. Will people say, he wonders, that subjects who are bound to
obey the sovereign have in effect been reduced to a condition of slavery
(TTP 16.10)? A long line of republican writers had defined a slave as
someone who is subject to arbitrary power, and had argued that a sovereign
exercises arbitrary power when it is in a position to enforce laws to which its
subjects have not consented. For example, when a monarch makes use of
prerogative powers it turns its subjects into slaves; but when the citizens of a
republic are bound by laws to which they have agreed, including laws
licensing punishment, they remain free men.15 Spinoza both appeals to and
modifies this position by implicitly reinterpreting its understanding of the
distinction between arbitrary and non-arbitrary power. In order to deter-
mine whether subjects are free men or slaves, he argues, one must ask
whether the law serves the common good. If it does, subjects remain free.
Only when the law fails to meet this condition are they enslaved. By
implication, then, a sovereign whose laws serve the common good does
not exercise arbitrary power, and its capacity to coerce its citizens does not
remove their liberty.
This argument is open to more than one interpretation. Concentrating
on what they call the democratic conatus within Spinoza’s philosophical
system, commentators such as Negri and Matheron have inferred that
only a democratically made law can serve the good of the community as
a whole.16 In order to be a free man, one must play a part in making laws
15 See Skinner 1998.
16 See for example Matheron 1997: 216–17, and Negri 1997: 227–28: ‘‘In Spinoza the conception of the
magistrate and the magistracy . . . is absolutely unitary . . . Just as each subject is a citizen, so each
citizen is a magistrate – but the magistracy is the moment of revelation of the highest potential of
unity and freedom.’’
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that bind each individual to act ‘‘for the common good, and thus for his
own good’’ (TTP 16.10). This reading accords with Spinoza’s image of
exemplary democracy, and helps to explicate the rich form of freedom that
such a polity can guarantee. However, it neglects a crucial dimension of
Spinoza’s discussion. The question concerning him in this stretch of the
Tractatus Theologico-Politicus is whether the coercive power of the law
removes subjects’ freedom, and his answer is that subjects are not enslaved
unless the law fails to uphold the common good. If it were the case that the
common good is protected only when the law is made by a democratic
sovereign, then the only way to escape slavery would be to live in a
democracy. But this is not the conclusion Spinoza draws. Instead, he
appeals to the analogy between a sovereign and a father to indicate how
it is possible for subjects to be free while also being bound to obey laws they
have not made. Fathers, Spinoza assumes, have a paternal duty to look after
their sons by directing them to act in ways that will benefit them, and sons
are correspondingly obliged to obey their fathers’ commands. When a son
fails to recognize that it is in his interest to do what his father tells him, his
father may force him to obey, and in these circumstances he is subject to
coercion. But as long as his father has his interests at heart, he is not
enslaved.17 Similarly, a sovereign may have to coerce individuals into
obeying the law; but as long as it enforces laws that protect the welfare of
the people, it rules over subjects rather than slaves.
This argument secures the possibility that subjects can be free in non-
democratic states by setting a minimum standard for what is to count as
liberty. It therefore offers a means to characterize the inhabitants of at least
some aristocracies andmonarchies as free. In addition, however, it provides
a way to justify the view that some subjects should be prohibited from
contributing to the business of legislation. Spinoza’s analysis of the rela-
tionship between fathers and sons presumably also applies to the various
classes of people who, even in the democratic constitution broached at the
end of the Tractatus Politicus, are held to be ineligible to play a part in
making the law: servants, minors, wards, women, poor men, aliens, crim-
inals and other dishonourable persons.18 Individuals who fall into these
categories are excluded from politics. Yet as long as the law secures the
common good and thus their own good, they remain free. Some of them,
17 This argument rides on a Latin pun. Sons who are not enslaved remain liberi, which can be translated
both as ‘free persons’ and as ‘children’.
18 These exclusions are sometimes glossed over. See for example Israel 2001: 260. Their incongruity
with other aspects of Spinoza’s philosophy is powerfully illuminated by Gatens 1996, and discussed
by Montag 1999: 83–86.
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such as married women and servants, have simultaneous duties to obey
other authorities, such as husbands or masters; but although this gives them
a distinctive legal status, it does not of itself turn them into slaves.
In defining the lower boundary of a free way of life, Spinoza offers
sovereigns and subjects a guiding principle: if slavery is to be avoided, the
law must uphold the common good. However, as we have come to expect,
this principle stands in need of interpretation. In making the law, a
sovereign relies on its imaginative capacity to envisage legal arrangements
that it and its subjects can recognize and accept as a credible representation
of the common good; and where it is successful, subjects will be able to
conceive of themselves as free. Drawing on the Ethics, we can envisage an
ideal democracy where the sovereign, constituted by the whole body of the
people, guarantees its own common good. Not only does each subject
participate in making legislation, but because the members of the com-
munity appreciate the advantages of co-operation, they do all they can to
devise laws that reconcile divergent desires and enhance their collective
efforts to enrich their own freedom. In his other works, however, Spinoza
offers a more cautious account of what it takes to satisfy his conception of
political liberty. The Tractatus Theologico-Politicus defends the view that
sovereign monarchs and aristocratic assemblies need not enslave their
subjects, and may provide them with as much freedom and security as
they are capable of attaining. The Tractatus Politicus offers us an image of a
democratic constitution where only a proportion of male subjects make the
law, and represent the voices of politically invisible classes such as women
and servants. Here, then, a subset of the population is exclusively invested
with the capacity to determine the common good.
So while democracy functions for Spinoza as an exemplar or ideal on the
basis of which we can try to enlarge our freedom, he also holds that it can
only exist in certain circumstances. The secure freedom that states should
aim to create depends on the understandings and imaginations of partic-
ular communities, and only some of them are in a position to sustain a
democratic way of life. Where the resources needed to manage this are
lacking, a community may maximize the freedom and security available to
it under a non-democratic constitution. A sensitivity to the imaginative
demands of politics therefore shapes Spinoza’s view of constitutional forms
such as monarchy and aristocracy. But in a different way it also moulds his
treatment of democracy itself.
Against the inclusive spirit of his democratic exemplar, the Tractatus
Politicus defends what is to modern eyes an incomplete form of democracy.
This limitation is worth examining; for although, as many commentators
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have pointed out, it is unsurprising that spinoza should hold the view he
does, his account of the democratic state nevertheless provides a vivid
illustration of the extent to which our freedom depends on our imaginative
capacities. As we have seen, Spinoza’s philosophical writings contain a
subtle and suggestive exploration of the role of imagination in politics.
Nevertheless, when he comes to envisage a democracy – a society in which
the whole body of the people makes laws that answer to the common good –
he excludes a large segment of the population. The body of the people, as
he interprets it, just is a community of propertied men, and the implication
that the common good can be upheld by the laws they make does not
appear to cause him any disquiet. Viewed from the perspective of the
democratic ideal, this interpretation embodies a grave imaginative failure;
it falls short of envisaging the kind of truly inclusive democracy in which, as
we learn from the Ethics, freedom and security are most fully realized. But
it also illustrates one of Spinoza’s most central claims: that successful
democracies crucially depend on the imaginative abilities of their sover-
eigns and subjects, and that lack of imaginative power is among the chief
factors that hold them back.19
19 I am deeply grateful to Moira Gatens and Quentin Skinner and to Theo Verlseek and his colleagues
at the University of Utrecht for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
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